Maxwell JW, Lyon TP, Hackett SC (2000) Self-regulation and social welfare: the political economy of coporate environmentalism. J Law Econ 43 (2): 583-617 We examine the effects of costly enforcement on the ability of voluntary agreements with industry to achieve regulatory objectives, the degree of industry participation in such agreements, and the relative effectiveness of voluntary and regulatory approaches. a voluntary agreement may be more effective in achieving an overall emissions target than a conventional emissions tax, but only if: (1) there are profitable voluntary agreements in which the members of the agreement pay for their implementation; 2. The members of a voluntary agreement shall effectively bear the costs of implementing the agreement; (3) the agreement is implemented by a third party, not by the government, and (4) that third party has a significant advantage in monitoring the technology and/or sanctions available over the government. Borkey P, Leveque F (2000) Voluntary approaches for environmental protection in the European Union – a survey. Eur Approx. 10 (1): 35-54 Glachant M (2007) Voluntary non-binding agreements. J Environ Econ Manag 54 (1): 32-48 Bailey PM (1999) The creation and implementation of environmental agreements. Eur Environ Law Rev 8(6): 169-179 Dawson NL, Segerson K (2008) Voluntary agreements with industries: participation incentives with industry-wide targets. Land Econ 84 (1): 97-114 An increasingly popular tool for solving environmental problems is the „public voluntary agreement (VA)“, in which the government provides technical assistance and positive publicity to companies that achieve certain environmental goals.
Previous documents treat these agreements as a superior and inexpensive instrument that can be used to prevent the threat of traditional and ineffective regulation. We present a more general model, in which public VAS can rather be weak instruments if political opposition makes environmental taxes unenforceable. We examine the conditions under which taxation, public SA and unilateral industrial measures are expected, as well as the impact of the various instruments on well-being. In particular, we also show that the introduction of public ASVs can reduce well-being. Lyon TP, Maxwell JW (2003) Self-regulation, taxation and voluntary public environmental agreements. J Public Econ 87 (7-8): 1453-1486 Segerson K, Miceli TJ (1998) Voluntary environmental agreements: good or bad news for environmental protection? J Environ Econ Manag 36(2): 109-130 Kolstad C (2007) Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements. . . .